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Talking Sense about “Political Correctness” 
 
Over the last seven years or so the expression “political correctness” has entered 
the political lexicon across the English speaking world.  Hundreds of opinion 
pieces in newspaper and magazines have been written about political 
correctness as well of scores of academic articles about it and the debates in 
which the expression gained its currency.  It is close to being received opinion in 
Anglo-American popular culture that a coalition of feminists, ethnic minorities, 
socialists and homosexuals have achieved such hegemony in the public sphere 
as to make possible their censorship, or at least the effective silencing, of views 
which differ from a supposed “politically correct” orthodoxy.  Correspondingly, 
it has become a popular tactic, especially in conservative political circles, to 
accuse one’s political opponents of being “politically correct”. 
 
In this paper I want to make a number of points about “political correctness”.  
Although individually these arguments seem straightforward - and will 
hopefully be uncontroversial - put together in context they reveal the idea of a 
“politically correct”, left-wing dominated, media or intelligentsia in Western 
political culture to be a conservative bogeyman.  The rhetoric of “political 
correctness” is in fact overwhelmingly a right-wing conservative one which 
itself is used mainly to silence dissenting political viewpoints.  But the same 
investigation also suggests that a “politics of speech” is an inevitable fact of 
social life and that some sorts of censorship are likewise inevitable.  The question 
of censorship is therefore revealed as not “Whether we should tolerate all sorts 
of speech?” but “Which sorts of speech should we tolerate?”. 
 
Before I continue I should make it clear what I am talking about when I talk 
about political correctness.  I intend only to discuss “political correctness” as it 
relates to the regulation and politics of speech.  In treating “political correctness” 
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in this way I am deliberately narrowing the scope of my inquiry.  In the United 
States, for instance, “political correctness” is used to refer to a whole series of 
progressive initiatives concerning changes to the literary canon taught at 
universities, the teaching of post-modern and critical literary theory and cultural 
studies, affirmative action for racial and ethnic minorities as well as women, 
sexual assault and harassment and regulations regarding campus “hate 
speech”.1 In Australia, also, the term has some currency in the conservative 
attack on multiculturalism and on attempts to rectify the injustices perpetrated 
in the past and continuing in the present against Aboriginal Australians.  Indeed 
contemporary usage of the term suggests that its application has arguably 
widened to refer to progressive politics as a whole.  But despite such wider uses, 
its primary meaning in the Australian context, is to refer to the criticism and 
regulation of speech and it is the coherence and implications of this sense of 
political correctness that I wish to discuss. 
 
Furthermore, even in this limited sphere, it seems to me that there are two 
discourses of political correctness in existence today, although one is rapidly 
being replaced by the other.  Both of them purport to describe the same 
phenomenon, albeit in very different ways.   
 
One of these, the one which is being overwhelmed, is what I shall characterise as 
a discourse from the Left, which embraces “political correctness” as the effort to 
be careful in our use of language in order not to exclude members of social 
                                                 
1 For an account of the history and politics of the wider “political correctness” debate in the 
United States, see Wilson, John, The Myth of Political Correctness:  The Conservative Attack on 
Higher Education, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1995).  There is now an 
extensive literature on the “political correctness” phenomenon.  For an introduction to this 
literature see the bibliography of Williams, Jeffrey (ed) PC Wars: Politics and Theory in the 
Academy (New York: Routledge, 1995). 
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groups, such as women, non English speakers, homosexuals or the disabled, 
from full political and civic participation and more generally to avoid expressing 
disrespect, whether intentionally or unintentionally, for members of oppressed 
or marginalised social groups. 2   Those who have been concerned with the 
politics of speech in this fashion are typically also concerned with social justice 
more broadly and are willing to enlist the state and redistributive welfare 
spending in the attempt to overcome the disadvantages facing various 
oppressed and minority groups.3   
 
The other, a discourse from the Right, which is in my judgement the dominant 
discourse, is hostile to “political correctness”, which they understand as an 
attempt by the Left to impose a certain political vision on an unwitting 
community and to silence dissenting political opinion.  According to the Right 
there are some things that people are not allowed to say, or are perhaps too 
frightened to say, because of the hegemony of a feminist, gay and anti-racist 
politics in the universities, media and intelligentsia.  This notion of political 
                                                 
2 In fact I have my reservations about the extent to which a Left wing discourse of “political 
correctness”, in Australia at least,  did exist prior to and independently of the right wing attack 
on it.  There was a concern with the politics of language and culture which was reflected in the 
promotion of gender-inclusive language and a sensitivity to issues of representation in general.  
But the term “political correctness” had no widespread currency.  I suspect the use of the 
language of “political correctness” by some sections of the Left to refer to these commitments 
was the result of a failure to resist the discourse of the Right when the term began to appear in 
the popular press.  For the origins and history of the expression in the United States, see 
Wilson, op cit, Chapter 1.  For a brief history of the debate about “political correctness” in 
Australia, see Davis, Mark, Gangland (St Leonards, N.S.W: Allan and Unwin, 1997), Chapter 3. 
3 See, for instance, Perry, Richard and Williams, Patricia “Freedom of Hate Speech” in Paul 
Berman(ed), Debating PC (New York: Laurel Trade, 1992), 225-30; Alibhai-Brown, Yasmin, 
“The Great Backlash” in Dunant, Sarah (ed), The War of the Words: The Political Correctness 
Debate (London: Virago, 1994), 55-75.   See also the history of “PC” politics in the U.K. provided 
by Stuart Hall in “Some ‘Politically Incorrect’ Pathways”, in Dunant, 164-183. 
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correctness gained currency through the writings and activities of a number of 
high-profile conservative and neo-conservative authors in the United States, 
such as Allan Bloom, Dinesh D’Souza, Roger Kimball and Nat Hentoff, 
sometimes with the benefit of funding from conservative Christian think tanks.  
Its proponents are often religious traditionalists or cultural conservatives, are 
typically hostile to feminism, socialism and homosexuality and opposed to 
affirmative action programs and other redistributive social welfare programs.4 
 
I will be largely concerned with the discourse of “political correctness” as it is 
used by the Right.  One of my aims here however is to provide a qualified 
defence of the discourse of the Left.5  
 
 
I. The first thing we need to do to understand the issues around political 
correctness is to distinguish between criticism and censorship.  Much of the 
                                                 
4 Bloom, Allan, The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987);  D’Souza, 
Dinesh, Illiberal Education (New York: The Free Press, 1991), esp. Chapter 5, “The New 
Censorship”; Kimball, Roger, Tenured Radicals: How Politics Has Corrupted Our Higher Education 
(New York: Harper Perennial, 1991); Hentoff, Nat, Free Speech for Me - But Not for Thee (New 
York: Harper Collins, 1992).  For an account of the involvement of conservative think tanks in 
the US in shaping the debate on PC and funding conservative authors see Neilson, Jim, “The 
Great PC Scare: Tyrannies of the Left, Rhetoric of the Right” in Williams, op cit.  For more 
general discussion of the politics of the campaign against PC in the US, see the introduction to 
Berube, Michael, Public Access: Literary Theory and American Cultural Politics (London & New 
York: Verso, 1994).  For the Australian case, see Davis, op cit. 
5 Of course this distinction is somewhat overdrawn.  It is a minor feature of the debate around 
political correctness that a number of prominent left wing and liberal commentators have seen 
fit to take up the usage of political correctness pioneered by the right.  See, for instance, the 
contributions of Melanie Philips and Christopher Hitchens in Dunant, op cit  But it is the 
argument of this paper that, despite the liberal intentions of some of its proponents, this 
discourse of political correctness is a profoundly conservative one with reactionary 
consequences.  See also Alibhai-Brown, op cit. 
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debate around political correctness treats the issue as one of censorship.  But, in 
fact, most of what is labelled “political correctness” by the Right is merely 
criticism of opposing viewpoints, rather than the demand that the state should 
intervene to prevent a view from being heard.  Thus, for instance, criticism of a 
film for being sexist or racist will be labelled as an attempt to enforce “political 
correctness” and thus characterised as an attempt to censor an exercise of “free 
speech”.  But there is a large gap between criticising something and saying that it 
should be censored.  Even if the critic’s review said something along the lines of 
“This is a terrible film.  It is a sexist film.  It should have never have been made 
and, now that it has been made, no-one should go and see it” this is still a far cry 
from saying that the government should have intervened to prevent it from 
being made or distributed.  Indeed it is quite common for people to make the 
most damning criticism of an intellectual position they dislike but defend the 
right of their opponents to voice it.  This is, after all, a standard liberal move.  
There are obvious dangers involved in censorship, due to the nature of state 
power, which may well give us cause to pause before we demand that the 
government should step in to prevent an opinion that we don’t like from being 
heard or voiced.  But they give us no reason not to say that we dislike the 
opinion and that it is a stupid opinion that no-one in their right mind could take 
seriously.  That’s criticism, not censorship, and it is a normal - indeed a 
necessary - part of political debate.   
 
This slide between criticism and censorship is large part of what makes the 
right-wing discourse of political correctness so powerful. After all, no-one likes a 
censor.  Usually, however, it is a dishonest slide.  In fact, on the Left, calls for 
actual state backed censorship are uncommon.6  Most of what is labelled political 
                                                 
6  The exception of course being feminist campaigns against pornography championed by 
Andrea Dworkin and Catherine McKinnon.  But these calls have notably also been supported 
by the Moral Majority and in any case have been largely unsuccessful. 
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correctness is just political criticism and thus, in these cases, discussion of the 
evils of censorship is a red herring.  Recognising this distinction alone is 
sufficient to dismiss a substantial proportion of the uses of the term in day to day 
political life. 
 
In many cases then, when the Right condemns “political correctness”, their real 
target is political criticism.  But this hostility to criticism obviously occurs 
selectively. When people are critical of a racist’s public statements they are 
guilty of “political correctness” and by implication of siding with the censors.  
When the racist expresses their racist sentiments they are exercising their 
“freedom of speech”. 7   This convenient flexibility as to what counts as 
censorship and what counts as speech is another feature of the right-wing 
discourse of “political correctness” which contributes to its effectiveness as a 
powerful conservative rhetorical tool. 
 
Of course, it is possible for a repressive orthodoxy to grow up in a community.  
Governments are not the only source of effective censorship.  There is also the 
possibility of, what Mill described as, “the despotism of custom” acting to 
effectively silence dissent.8  This informal but equally effective censorship may 
even be more pernicious then censorship by the state, which has at least the 
virtues of being explicit and usually heavy handed.  Certain opinions might be 
so widely and strongly held in community that dissident views are subject to 
such a barrage of criticism that they cannot be heard or that people may become 
                                                 
7 This paper was written in a period following the election of an Independent MP, Pauline 
Hanson, to the Parliament of Australia.  Hanson was widely criticised for her open racism.  She 
responded to her critics by calling them “politically correct”.  In the same period the Prime 
Minister, Mr. John Howard, refused to criticise her expression of racist views on the grounds 
that she had a right to “free speech”. 
8 Mill, John Stuart, On Liberty, ed. David Spitz (New York: Norton & Co., 1975), 66-67. 
7 
too intimidated to voice them.  And this is presumably what conservative critics 
of political correctness in are claiming has happened.9  This is apparently why so 
many, although not themselves racist, embrace the open expression of racist 
opinions - they admire speakers saying what others have been too scared to say, 
supposedly because of their fear of a torrent of condemnation from PC critics.10  I 
will consider the plausibility of this claim shortly. 
 
Before I go on however, I want to note the irony of the fact that the conservative 
attack on “political correctness” actually concedes that criticism - mere speech - 
does have the power to influence and to silence others in politically significant 
ways. This is after all the starting point of a left-wing concern with the politics of 
speech.  It seems therefore that the Left and the Right in the debate surrounding 
political correctness actually agree, contrary to traditional liberals, that the 
things we say and the rhetorics we use to express them may limit the 
possibilities for other different viewpoints to be expressed and heard and are 
therefore a proper subject for public political concern.  Where they differ is on is 
their assessments of who is in danger of being silenced and marginalised in 
contemporary political discourse and what sorts of discursive practices are 
responsible for this silencing. 
 
 
                                                 
9 See for instance, D’Souza, op cit, Chapter 5.  See also Davis, op cit. 
10 It was for instance the implication of Australian Prime Minister John Howard’s claim after his 
recent election, in a political context where Independent MP Pauline Hanson had also been 
elected as an open racist, that there was a new atmosphere of openness in Australian politics 
and that this constituted a victory for “freedom of speech”.   
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II. The next thing which needs to be said is to point out that, in reality, the vast 
majority of both formal (state) and informal (social) censorship originates on the 
Right.11  
 
Before we get too concerned about the sorts of things that the Left would prefer 
we did not say, we should have a look at what sorts of speech we are already 
forbidden.  In fact it’s quite a bit.  From time immemorial, governments have 
made it a crime to voice certain opinions in public and continue to do so ‘till this 
day.12   Thus, for instance, in most jurisdictions around the world legislation 
exists that forbids speech which encourages criminal activities or incites riots, 
which defames or libels, or which threatens the “national interest”.  There is also 
the censorship of film and literature which offends community standards, which 
goes on under the auspices of various boards of censors or offices of “Film & 
Literature Classification”.  Such censorship, by appointed panels of government 
officials or “upstanding” members of the community, goes on explicitly to 
prevent materials which offend prevailing community standards from reaching 
our shores.  For most of history this has included such things as explicit 
representations of sexuality, writing about various forms of sexual experience, 
                                                 
11 For accounts of the history of censorship in Australia, see Coleman, Peter, Obscenity, Blasphemy, 
Sedition, (Brisbane: Jacaranda Press, 1975), Martin, Brian et al (ed), Intellectual Suppression: 
Australian Case Histories, Analysis and Responses, (Sydney: Angus and Robinson, 1986), and 
Pollack, Michael, Sense & Censorship: Commentaries on censorship violence in Australia, (Sydney: 
Reed Books, 1990).  For a discussion of censorship on the grounds of public morality in the 
United Kingdom and United States see MacMillan, Peter, Censorship and Public Morality 
(Aldershot: Gower, 1983). 
12 As Wilson, op cit, p 91 notes, the US Supreme Court “has accepted limits on fee speech in cases 
of immediate harm, captive audiences, criminal threat, obscenity, immediate riot and time, 
place and manner restrictions.”  The relevant cases, according to Wilson, are “Shenck v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919): Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973): Brandengurg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44 (1969):  Heffron, 452 U.S. 640 
(1981)”.  
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attacks on the church, communist “propaganda” and other materials deemed 
blasphemous, seditious or obscene.13  Censorship on conservative grounds has 
been enforced vigorously for most of recent history and it continues to occur, 
although less often, to this day. 
 
Rather than being the work of feminists, socialists or homosexuals, the interests 
protected by this legislation are overwhelmingly conservative - which may go 
some way towards explaining why we hear so little discussion of these 
restrictions on “freedom of speech” in discussions of political correctness.  
Besides this array of legal prohibitions, the threat to freedom of speech from the 
Left looks insignificant.  There simply isn’t any comparable state backed 
program of regulation of speech which is motivated by left-wing concerns.  
Admittedly, in various jurisdictions around the world, there is now legislation 
intended to deter incitement to racial hatred.  But such legislation merely 
extends to members of ethnic groups a similar protection from harm as is 
granted to the nation as a whole.  The idea that speech can be regulated to 
protect a group (i.e. the nation) from harm is, as I shall argue further below, 
already accepted across the political spectrum.  The only thing new about 
legislation against incitement to racial hatred is that the group which is 
protected is sub national.  Compared to legislation which exists to protect the 
“national interest” or the reputation of public figures from defamation, the 
legislation protecting members of racial groups from vilification is also typically 
weaker, invokes smaller penalties and is used less often.14 
 
                                                 
13 See note 11 for sources. 
14  For an overview of legislation concerning “racial vilification” within Australia and 
internationally see Duranti, Victor, Racial Vilification: An Overview of the Issues (Department of 
the Parliamentary Library, 1994). 
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Perhaps critics of political correctness might admit that the main threat of 
censorship does not arise from the state legislating in the public sphere but 
instead originates from what they perceive as a rising tide of efforts to impose 
formal, but non state, censorship, in institutions such as schools, universities and 
perhaps the press. There have indeed been various attempts to introduce 
guidelines and in some case regulations into these institutions concerning 
campus hate speech, gender inclusive language use, sexual harassment etc.  But 
again, concern for the public culture of institutions is hardly a recent 
phenomenon or exclusively or even mainly the prerogative of the Left.  There 
have always been standards about what it was appropriate to teach and say and 
do in schools and universities.  Repeated conservative outcries when sex or drug 
education groups try to publish materials which talk openly about gay sex or 
drug use or introduce them into the education system should serve to remind us 
that an enthusiasm for censorship from the Right in these forums continues to 
this day.15  Not only has popular political pressure often been brought to bear on 
these institutions to prevent “inappropriate” voices being heard within in them, 
but most institutions also maintain formal mechanisms of censorship which can 
be mobilised if radical voices are raised too loudly and too often.  Most 
university statutes, for instance, contain provisions that allow that staff may be 
dismissed and students expelled for conduct which brings the university into 
disrepute.  Schools have codes of behaviour which they expect their students to 
abide by and they may expel them if they do not.  Most non-government 
publications which receive government funding are subject to formal 
restrictions as to the purposes to which it can be used or at least face the prospect 
of the withdrawal of their funding if they offend the (conservative) powers that 
be too grossly.  Even in the supposedly left-wing arena of the schools, 
                                                 
15 For discussion of what he calls “Conservative correctness” on campuses in the US, see Wilson, 
op cit, Chapter 2.  
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universities and the media, then, it would be difficult to argue that the major 
threat of censorship arises from the Left.16 
 
Perhaps the real threat to freedom of speech, then, occurs not directly from the 
government or in the universities or the media but in the workplace?  In some 
jurisdictions around the world, laws have been passed concerning sexual 
harassment in the workplace which establish penalties for verbal or written 
sexual harassment such as unsolicited sexual comments, propositions or 
innuendo.  Or, as a result pressure from the women’s movement, corporations 
have themselves developed policies designed to curb sexual harassment which 
target speech of this sort.  The existence of such policies is claimed by the Right 
as evidence of “political correctness”.  But again regulation of speech in the 
workplace is nothing new, nor is it solely, or even mostly, the province of the 
Left.  There is a great deal of, almost entirely conservative, censorship which 
occurs in the workplace as a result of the restrictions placed on workers when 
they enter the wage-labour agreement. Along with the other freedoms which 
workers agree to forgo in return for an income goes “freedom of speech”.  In 
some cases the restrictions on the speech of workers will be explicit, as in cases 
when workers are forbidden to distribute union materials or organise in the 
workplace and when union officials are denied contact with the workers.  Of 
course, these restrictions operate only in the workplace and leave workers free to 
speak their minds outside of working hours.  But restrictions which bind 
workers outside of the workplace and working hours are also common.  
Workers in the public sector as well as many in the corporate sector are bound 
by confidentiality and privacy agreements which restrict their right to speak 
both inside and outside of the workplace.17  Even in the absence of such formal 
                                                 
16 For a discussion of “political correctness” and campus speech codes see Wilson, op cit, 
Chapter 4. 
17 Legislation concerning privacy, commercial confidentiality and copyright in fact constitute a 
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regulation of speech in (and outside) the workplace there are almost always 
informal prohibitions which limit what is said in and outside the workplace 
implicit in the wage-labour contract.  The sorts of speech forbidden by these 
informal edicts are by and large not racist or sexist remarks but rather criticism 
of management, complaints about working conditions, advocacy of unionisation 
or anything else the owners of the means of production disapprove of.  Such 
limitations do not need to be made formal conditions of the employment 
contract because they are implicit in the power relation between the worker and 
management which allows management to threaten the income of workers.  
Workers who argue with or are disrespectful to their bosses, who speak up in 
defence of their wages and conditions or who express their true opinions about 
their firm’s products or services to customers jeopardise their employment in 
doing so.  Workers are well aware of what they can and cannot say within the 
workplace without risk of dismissal and those who are not are quickly made 
aware of these limits, often by reprimand or threat from the employer.  Those 
who continue to voice “incorrect” sentiments are removed by sacking.  Because 
they occur in the “private” sphere of contract between worker and owner, the 
implicit restrictions on liberty which are an integral part of the wage-labour 
agreement are one of the least acknowledged sources of censorship.  Yet they 
prohibit “free” speech, for those who work, for eight hours of each day for most 
of their lifetime in a significant discursive sphere. 
 
Thus far I have largely been concerned with formal or state sanctioned 
censorship. As critics of political correctness have aptly reminded us, a 
prevailing climate of opinion may serve to silence dissent just as or even more 
                                                                                                                                               
whole class of restrictions on freedom of speech which are seldom recognised in discussions of 
the issue. See Drahos, Peter, “Decentring Communication: The Dark Side of Intellectual 
Property” in Campbell, Tom and Sadurski, Wojciech (ed), Freedom of Communication (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth Publishing, 1994). 
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effectively than the (not so) long arm of the law.  So now let us consider whether 
a repressive left-wing orthodoxy exists in this country or indeed in anywhere in 
the world where the term “PC” has currency.  Is the media or even the 
university dominated by feminists, socialists, Asians, aborigines and 
homosexuals?  Are men, the business community, WASPS and heterosexuals 
scared to voice their opinions for fear of being howled down by a PC Mafia?  
When members of these groups do bravely have their say, is it the case that they 
are consistently ignored, dismissed, laughed at or otherwise not heard?  I can’t 
see it myself.  They are occasionally criticised, usually when they attack the 
rights or interests of members of less privileged groups and sometimes - even 
more occasionally - widely so, when they do so out of ignorance or malice.  But 
these criticisms hardly silence them or prevent them from being heard.  Indeed, 
if the media circus which typically surrounds open racists is anything to go on 
then these criticisms unwittingly provoke them to speak more loudly and be 
heard more often, as they are repeatedly sought after by the media to respond to 
their critics.  The idea that there exists a repressive left-wing orthodoxy in public 
culture just seems laughable.18 
 
In fact a much more convincing case can be made for the existence of a 
conservative political culture or orthodoxy which marginalises and silences 
progressive concerns.  If one really wants a demonstration of the presence of 
“political correctness” in Australian culture then there is no better way to get it 
than to walk down to the local bar and start talking loudly and proudly about 
one’s gay lover or even just walk down the wrong street arm in arm with one’s 
same sex lover.  Unless one is lucky, the importance of not straying outside the 
bounds of accepted opinion will be impressed upon you and most likely a good 
deal more forcefully than with a few politely spoken words of criticism.  Less 
                                                 
18 Davis, op cit. 
14 
dramatic examples can be found if we consider the fate of feminism and 
socialism in mainstream political culture.  It seems to me that allegiance to either 
of these ideologies would have to figure amongst the most politically incorrect 
statements to make in the current climate.  Identifying oneself as either a 
feminist or a socialist more or less guarantees hostility, trivialisation and ridicule 
in most forums outside of the academy and some within it.  So much is this so 
that many people are reluctant to identify themselves as such simply because of 
the misunderstanding and difficulties it causes.  My own experience of raising 
issues about the undemocratic nature of capitalism in the prevailing political 
climate, even in the academy, is that those questions are simply dismissed.  If 
they are not openly laughed at, they are at least not taken seriously.  They are 
certainly not addressed.  They are simply not fashionable.  To put it another way 
they are not “politically correct”. 
 
These examples could be extended indefinitely.  Australian culture, like other 
Western political cultures, already maintains a vigorous, if largely unnoticed, 
sense of “political correctness”.  But it is a conservative, white, racist, 
male-oriented and homophobic one.  It was precisely in recognition of this that 
some on the Left became concerned with issues about the politics of 
representation and of language use. 
 
Furthermore, in the current period the right-wing discourse of PC actually plays 
a key role in maintaining this conservative “political correctness”.  Increasingly, 
criticism of the existing sexist and racist culture is labelled as “just more 
‘political correctness’“ and dismissed.  Sometimes it will even be described as 
“the dictates of the thought police”, “intellectual fascism” or “Stalinist”. 19  
                                                 
19 See Wilson, op cit, p23 and Neilson, Jim, “The Great PC Scare: Tyrannies of the Left, Rhetoric 
of the Right” in Williams, op cit, for lists of such references in the conservative literature on 
“political correctness” in higher education. 
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Painting one’s critics as PC today achieves a number of powerful conservative 
rhetorical effects.  It valorises the conservative’s position by making it appear as 
though it were a courageous and free-thinking challenge to a repressive 
orthodoxy rather than the banal expression of bigotry it typically is.  It distracts 
attention from the content of the criticism and reduces it to merely another 
attempt by those with totalitarian tendencies to censor free speech and in this 
way mitigates the need to respond to it.  When people come to see that to speak 
out against sexism and racism means being misrepresented, ridiculed and 
dismissed, likened to Hitler and Stalin, they are less likely to do so.  In this way 




III.  As the preceding discussion should make clear, almost no-one on the 
political spectrum is willing to advocate that there should be no limits on public 
speech.  If the Left would like to see racist, sexist or homophobic hate speech 
outlawed and other less explicit forms of sexism, racism and homophobia 
discouraged, the Right is by no means short of targets for the repressive force of 
the law or public opinion either.  In case it is thought that an enthusiasm for 
censorship is a trait of extremists at either end of the political spectrum but not of 
the enlightened liberals in the middle, let me remind you that the prospect of 
immediate and substantial harm to others occurring as the direct result of an act 
of speech, at least, is considered by almost everyone to justify censorship of 
some sort.  To raise the hackneyed philosophical example, few are prepared to 
defend the right of the troublemaker to cry “fire” in a crowded theatre. Nor are 
too many people prepared to defend the right of a newspaper to personally 
                                                 
20 See Fish, Stanley, There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech (New York & Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), Chapter 7. 
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vilify a public figure or deliberately publish lies about a community or business 
project or to expose the nations carefully constructed and concealed defence 
plans.  The fact is that certain sorts of speech can harm important interests and 
this is generally recognised to justify restrictions on those types of speech.21  
 
This might seem too obvious to point out but it is important.  Critics of “political 
correctness” like to portray the debate surrounding it as a conflict between 
moralistic censors on one side and staunch defenders of freedom of speech on 
the other.  But this is a misportrait.  Change the sort of speech being defended 
and the staunch defenders of free speech are most likely firm believers in the 
need for restrictions on the liberty of some to prevent harm to others even in the 
realm of speech.  This is an empirical fact about politics, but I cannot over 
emphasise how important I think it is for the understanding the debate around 
censorship and “free speech”.  There are few theorists and no governments who 
would support absolute freedom of speech.  Some sorts of speech, such as those 
which publicise the nation’s defence secrets to the enemy or which incite 
violence against members of the community, destroy the very fabric of the 
community which makes speech possible.  The real debate around censorship is 
not about whether censorship is justified in some circumstances, because 
everyone agrees on this.  It is about what justifies it.  Once the debate is 
understood in this light it becomes more possible to have an intelligent 
discussion about whether or not harm caused to members of minority groups by 
certain sorts of speech act might justify restrictions on speech in exactly the same 
way as harm caused by libel or defamation to individuals justifies restrictions on 
our “freedom” to libel or defame or in the same way that the “national interest” 
justifies censorship.22   
                                                 
21 See note 12 for a list of decisions in the US Supreme Court that the right to “free speech” could 
be limited on such grounds. 
22 Fish, op cit, 106-11. 
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Not only is there an explicit consensus on the necessity of state and other sorts of 
formal censorship but there is also an implicit consensus, expressed in practice, 
on the important and necessary role played by various types of informal 
censorship.  In personal conversation we naturally restrict the people that we are 
willing to talk to.  If someone is abusive or ill-mannered or talks utter nonsense 
then we will point this out and eventually, if they persist in doing so, we will 
walk away.  A certain level of respect for the other speakers is necessary in order 
to maintain a conversation.   
 
But, as well as respect for the participants in a dialogue, we also recognise the 
need for respect for various conventions about the content of contributions to a 
discussion.  In order for a dialogue or debate to flourish contributions to it must 
be, as much as possible, relevant, well informed, clearly expressed, productive, 
intelligent and otherwise suitable along any other number of dimensions.  They 
should not be ignorant, stupid, obstructive, or irrelevant, etc, otherwise they will 
only hamper debate and frustrate the other participants.  For this reason, in 
ordinary political practice we recognise the need for restrictions on the sort of 
material that one publishes in a given medium or tolerates in a particular forum.  
Editors select the material that they publish.  Radio stations choose who they 
will interview.  Chairpersons guide discussion towards the relevant issues and 
move to silence those who continue to dispute an issue after it has been resolved 
or whose contributions are otherwise unproductive.23  These sorts of limits on 
                                                 
23 The guidelines to the procedure of the House of Representatives of the Australian Parliament, 
House of Representatives Practice, Third Edition (Canberra: Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1997), for example, contain an entire chapter (Chapter 13) on “Control and 
conduct of debate” which governs when Members may speak (458-465), the manner in which 
they may speak (465-470) and insists that “Of fundamental importance to the conduct of 
debate in the House is the rule that no Member may digress from the subject matter of any 
question under discussion”(470).  Further restrictions on the content of Member’s speeches are 
18 
speech abound because speech is always for something.  Our (and other’s) 
speech is important to us not because we simply like to make noise but because 
we are involved in common projects with those we are speaking to.  We are 
trying to decide a certain issue, seeking the truth, trying to resolve our 
disagreements without recourse to violence or debating legislation, etc.  Speech 
is a means rather than an end in itself.  But once we acknowledge this we can see 
that some sorts of speech, in some circumstances will not serve those ends - and 
thus the very same grounds we have for defending open debate will work in 
these cases to justify silencing these sorts of speech.24  
 
The point that I want to emphasise here is that the grounds we have for making 
decisions of this sort are always political.  That is, they necessarily involve 
reference to our commitments about the issues at hand.  The best way to 
recognise a stupid argument is that it consistently leads to stupid conclusions.  
Our judgements about the relevance or irrelevance of a contribution to a debate 
cannot be divorced from our understanding of substantive issues.  Our 
assessment of what counts as a productive contribution will depend on what we 
think the debate is about and where it should go.  In this way we are making 
political judgements about what sorts of opinions should be published or heard 
or criticised all the time. 
 
So again we find there is a consensus on the need for informal forms of 
censorship.  Indeed, as I will argue below, these are actually inevitable.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
outlined at 470-485. 
24 See Fish, op cit, Chapters 8 and 9. 
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IV.  Up to this point I have been talking largely about empirical facts about the 
politics of the debate around political correctness. I now want to introduce some 
more philosophic reflections about the nature of communication and the concept 
of “freedom of speech” which also impact on the debate. A quick excursion into 
semiotics reveals to us, I believe, that absolute “freedom of speech” is an 
incoherent notion.  As structuralism and post-structuralism have argued, the 
meaning of signs is a function of the play of difference within a system of signs.  
The meaning of a word will be determined as much by what we cannot do with 
it as what we can.  Indeed these are two sides of one coin.  Thus the limits on our 
expression are simultaneously the enabling conditions of what we can express.  
This means that absolute freedom of expression is an impossibility.  A person 
who was free to say absolutely anything, to express any unique concept which 
came into their head, because they were not limited by the range of meanings 
they had available to them could, paradoxically say nothing at all.  
Communication requires restrictions.  It requires that our concepts have more or 
less determinate meanings.  Our ability to say what we can is thus founded on 
our inability to say what we cannot.25 
 
But perhaps this is just “grammatical correctness” or “speaking properly” rather 
than, as I am suggesting, a form of political correctness?  It is true that when 
these restrictions are uncontroversial they will simply appear as rules of 
grammar or conventions of proper speech.  But, even if it is not challenged, the 
structure of language is neither devoid of political implications nor untainted by 
politics in its origins.  
 
The system of differences which gives our words their meaning has political 
implications because it makes it easier to say some things and harder to say 
                                                 
25 Fish, op cit, p103. 
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others.  Some ideas will be easy to express in a given language because the 
system of differences will be structured to capture them.  Others will be difficult 
to convey and even to formulate because the language will be founded on their 
exclusion.  Even if it is possible, in a particular case to overcome these difficulties 
by constructing some complex phrasing to capture our intended meaning, the 
more elaborate elocutions that we need to use to convey our meaning when the 
words we have available are ill suited to us do not have the same force as the 
single words or snappy slogans of those whose ideas are already represented in 
the language.  Some political claims will therefore be advantaged and others 
disadvantaged.26 
 
The existence of the debate about political correctness is itself evidence of the 
political significance of the language available to us.  If the structure of the 
language had no political implications, if it genuinely didn’t matter whether the 
person running the committee was called a “the chair” or “chairman”, then the 
debate about political correctness would never have arisen.  The vehemence of 
the Right’s response to suggestions that we should change the way we speak is 
evidence that there is a political issue at stake. 
 
The current shape of our language is political in origin because the meanings 
available to us for our expression are themselves determined by the past and 
present usage of others.  Language is a social product and we all participate, 
although not always to the same extent, in its creation and the determination of 
the meaning of the words within it.  But, as we saw above, not all meanings suit 
everyone equally.  Some people will prefer a word to mean one thing, some 
another.  Sometimes the attempt to impose a preferred meaning on a term will 
become the site of an explicitly political struggle, as in the current debate around 
                                                 
26 Cameron, Deborah, “Words, Words, Words: The Power of Language” in Dunant, op cit. 
21 
political correctness.  This debate is, amongst other things, a struggle over the 
meanings of our words and the possibilities of expression available to us. It is 
clearly a political struggle consciously engaged in by parties with political 
agendas and which are, at least in some cases, supported by organised political 
lobby groups.27  But even when such explicitly political struggle does not occur, 
each usage of a word is a small act in a history which determines the meaning of 
that word and its possible future usages.  Each usage enables some other 
possible usages and constrains others.  No usage of a word is devoid of 
consequences for the ways in which others may use it.  Every usage occurs in a 
political context which partially determines which usages will carry authority 
and successfully achieve their intended affects and which will not.28 
 
Thus there is always and already a “politics” of speech - a struggle over the 
correct way to use language. Although its political dimensions may go 
unnoticed until a controversy erupts, this is not something that the Left have 
invented.  It has always existed because of the way language works.  Saying that 
one stands for simply for freedom in this arena is therefore nonsensical, because 
any and every usage will increase our freedom to use a word in certain ways and 
decrease our freedom to use it in others.  Which is not to say that there are not 
better and worse ways to use words. It’s just that these will not be distinguished 
by the extent to which they impinge on the ability of others to use them 
differently.  It is the content of the meaning of the word which is important here 
- not the fact that it has one. 
 
                                                 
27 See Neilson, op cit, for an account of how the campaign against “political correctness” was 
consciously shaped by the Right in the US and involved the provision of substantial funds to 
conservative ideologues by Right-wing foundations and think tanks. 
28 Cameron, op cit.  See also Pocock, J.G.A. “Verbalising A Political Act”, Political Theory, Vol 1, 
No 1. (1973), 27-45 at 31-36. 
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Similar points are true at the level of culture and politics.  Any political climate 
or culture promotes some ways of life and political opinions and discriminates 
against others.  That’s just what culture is.  It is a community’s set of conclusions 
and received opinions about the best way to lead a human life and consequently 
about the way we should order our society and behave towards those around us.  
It is impossible for a culture to include all forms of life and all expressions of 
opinion.  This is not just a practical impossibility.  It is a conceptual one.  
Cultures have a determinate content, they have world-views that they espouse 
and ways of life that they express and make possible - and these function to 
exclude other cultures.29 Thus, for instance, we cannot have a culture where 
racist statements go unremarked and where the moral claims of racial minorities 
to full citizenship are taken seriously.  Part of what it is to take racial justice 
seriously is to be offended and want to respond when people make racist 
remarks.30  We cannot have a culture where homosexuality is publicly accepted 
and where children are “protected” from the idea that homosexuality is a valid 
sexual preference.  As these examples make clear, facts about culture have 
political consequences and so culture itself defines a form of political correctness.  
Our culture determines what sort of behaviour is expected from people and 
what sorts of speech and behaviour will cause castigation and outrage.  A 
society without political correctness would be a society without culture.  It 
would be a society without shame, manners, or customs.  It would be a society 
                                                 
29 This is not to say that we cannot include elements from different cultures in our culture or 
even have a multicultural society.  We obviously can.  But  what results is not simply a number 
of cultures coexisting - it is a different culture.  And there will ways of life possible in each 
single culture which will not be possible in the multicultural society, such as those which 
require the participation of all members of society.  Being able to speak the same language as 
everyone in ones society is a case in point.   Bringing cultures together is therefore a process of 
subtraction as much as it is of addition. 
30 See the discussion of “reactive attitudes” in “Freedom and Resentment” in Strawson, P.F., 
Freedom and Resentment (London: Methuen & Co., 1974), 1-25. 
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where anything was possible and nothing frowned upon.  It would be a society 
without values.31 
 
Some form of political correctness is thus an inevitable fact of social life.  Once 
the debate is seen in this light it is a question of taking sides.  It is impossible not 
to limit the possibilities of expression in a culture.  The issue then is whether one 
prefers to defend the “free speech” for sexists, racists and homophobes and thus 
diminish the possibilities for the voices of women, people of colour, immigrants 
and gays to be heard or whether one will defend the rights of members of those 
groups to be heard by condemning sexism, racism and homophobia wherever it 
occurs.32 
 
Perhaps the conservative case is that it is wrong for the government, or perhaps 
for any social group, to consciously concern itself with language and culture in 
this way.  This claim would deserve more attention if the continuing outcry 
about political correctness weren’t so obviously the result of conservative 
groups and, to a certain extent, various national governments, doing just that.  
Their hostility to political correctness is motivated by a conscious concern for the 
political and intellectual climate in which they find themselves. They are 
consciously trying to turn back the cultural clock to the nineteen fifties, when 
people had pride in the nation, faith in the wisdom of government and business 
and when women were too busy trying to achieve equal pay and indigenous 
peoples the right to vote to attack the government for its sexist and racist 
language.33 
 
                                                 
31 Of course, in other circumstances this is a core tenet of conservative politics. 
32 See Fish, op cit, Chapter 8. 
33 See Fish, op cit, Chapter 3. 
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But isn’t there something very Orwellian about a government which is trying to 
change the way in which people use language in order to change the way they 
think?  A large part of our hostility to the idea of a government consciously 
involved in shaping culture stems from justified concerns about the 
appropriateness and the consequences of involving state power in this process.  
Bureaucracies are simply not very good at shaping cultures and the instruments 
they have to do so are sometimes clumsy and often dangerous. 34   But to 
acknowledge these considerations is not to concede that the state should simply 
not be concerned with culture.  The argument above sought to show that it is 
simply not possible to avoid engaging in a cultural politics.  “Doing nothing” is a 
policy and one with cultural and political consequences.  State action, even if 
disguised as inaction, inevitably impinges upon culture.35  The question then is, 
should it do so consciously or unconsciously?  An important fact to consider 
here, is that to remain unconscious of our responsibility for the culture in which 
we live is, in most cases, to adopt a conservative politics towards it.  By failing to 
take conscious action we tacitly support the status quo.  Once we’ve realised this, 
of course, to then say that the state should not be conscious of the affects of its 
actions on culture is to consciously recommend that it should pursue a 
conservative politics.  But, given that the state is necessarily implicated in a 
politics of culture, I can see no prima facie reason to suggest that the state should 
                                                 
34 Government have often been more successful at changing cultures than many of us would like 
to admit.  They seem quite successful at maintaining broad ideologies for periods of decades 
and also occasionally of achieving quite specific changes in behaviours and belief system 
around particular issues.  Consider for instance the success of efforts, by many governments 
around the globe, to reduce the road toll or to educate people around safe sexual practices. 
35 Indeed it is almost impossible for the modern state to even pretend to be doing nothing in the 
realm  of culture.  The modern state has already taken on the job of administering culture 
through its funding of the arts, control of school curriculum, responsibility for national 
holidays and a plethora of advertising campaigns surrounding health, civic pride, road safety, 
recruitment for the military etc.   
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favour a conservative rather than a progressive politics in this area.  This needs 
to be debated on the merits of the politics rather than stonewalled by insisting 
that the state has no role in determining culture.  
 
 
V.  Of course criticism of some formulations of political correctness advanced by 
the Left is also possible on other grounds.   
 
To begin with, “political correctness” is obviously not a label that one should 
rush to embrace.  Telling people that they should be “politically correct” is 
setting oneself up for the accusations of smug superiority or totalitarianism that 
the Right promotes - which is why the Right have pushed the rhetoric of PC so 
insistently.  If we do wish to consciously promote a certain politics of speech we 
should instead simply insist that one shouldn’t be racist or sexist.  Instead of 
talking about “politically correct” language we should criticise racism or sexism 
where it appears.  This puts the onus where it belongs, on the Right, to explain 
why the speech at issue isn’t sexist or why we should tolerate racist or sexist 
speech.  This is safer rhetorical ground than being forced to defend “political 
correctness”. 
 
But more importantly, concern about the politics of speech and culture should 
not distract our attention from the inequalities of political, economic and social 
power which underlie them.  Changing the names by which we refer to things 
does not in itself change the things themselves.  Political action addressing the 
social, economic and political inequalities which result in the marginalisation of 
certain groups in language and culture is necessary.  While it is undoubtedly 
true that the marginalisation of oppressed groups in language and culture works 
to maintain their oppression and reinforce their marginalisation in other spheres, 
it is not clear that addressing the problems at the level of language will in itself 
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have much affect at all on the deeper political, social and economic injustices.  
On the other hand, addressing these injustices is likely to greatly accelerate the 
process of the transformation of language and culture.  It would be wise then to 
concentrate on this latter project.36  To an extent, the current interest in the 
politics of language and culture is the result of the retreat of the Left into the 
academy and the bureaucracy from which vantage points it has been unable to 
exercise much influence over these more traditional political matters.  Unable (or 
unwilling) to participate in any mass based movement which might transform 
the political and economic structure of society the Left has been content to fiddle 
about with new speech codes or (more creditably) legislation outlawing 
discrimination. The irrelevance of these initiatives to the problems, such as low 
wages, unemployment, the rising cost of living and homelessness, facing a large 
number of the members of the very groups they are intended to serve goes a 
long way towards explaining the strength of the backlash against “political 
correctness” even amongst members of these groups. 
 
A complex set of issues about the value and function of state power is also raised 
by proposals that progressives should enlist the state in their efforts to transform 
culture.  The state is a conservative institution which is both disinclined and ill 
suited to achieve many of the Left’s goals.  It may be that attempts to use the 
state to promote a tolerant culture or to restrict racist and sexist speech will 
backfire and any resulting legislation be employed mainly by the Right against 
those very groups it was intended to serve.  But unless one is prepared to argue 
that this is inevitably the fate of any and all attempts by the Left to win political 
ground via the state - which would, it seems to me, be foolish - then this will 
need to be argued on the details of each proposed piece of legislation.  
Legislating from above also looks unlikely to achieve the deep social consensus 
                                                 
36 Ehrenreich, Barbara,  “The Challenge For the Left” in Berman, op cit, 333-338 at 336. 
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which is necessary to ensure a genuinely non racist or sexist society.  It may even 
generate resentment which results in political effects contrary to its intentions. 
On the other hand, legislation also functions as a statement of social consensus 
and can therefore send a clear message that certain sorts of behaviour are not 
welcome in our community.  The political struggle to achieve such a consensus 
may itself provide a valuable focus for political activity through which to raise 
the level of political consciousness around the issues in the community at large.  
For this reason even legislation which one admits is never likely to be enforced 
may be worth fighting for. 
 
These criticisms are importantly different to those which are made on the Right.  
They do not proceed from the disingenuous assumption that attempts to be 
conscious of the politics of speech and culture involve anything new or 
necessarily oppressive.  Instead they engage in a genuine debate about the 
politics of particular attempts to regulate speech.  They contest the importance 
and effectiveness of such regulation rather than the right to engage in it.  This 
does not mean that we should deny that the ability to formulate, express and 
have an opinion heard is an important political freedom which is crucial to the 
functioning of a democratic society.  Indeed, casting aside the illusion of “free 
speech” as maintained by the Right in favour of an awareness of the fact that 
speech is always already regulated, both formally and informally, makes us 
better able to consider the politics of such regulation and work to ensure that it is 
the best possible.  Only by recognising both the existing constraints on speech 
and the inevitably of some such constraints can we hope to establish a 
community in which all those voices whose expression is consistent with the 




VI.  There will inevitably some critics who will believe that I have completely 
missed the point.  The fact is, they will say, that political correctness has gone too 
far and that some sections of the Left have adopted a victim mentality wherein 
the slightest deviation from Left political orthodoxy is seized upon as evidence 
of sexism, racism or homophobia.  Le Pen’s politics aren’t racist.  Referring to a 
woman by her husband’s name isn’t sexist, etc.  The problem with contemporary 
“politically correct” intellectual culture is that it is simply too quick to condemn 
persons as bigots for a failure to use the proper political jargon or for stating 
opinions which are currently unpopular.  There may even be a grain of truth in 
this claim, although I admit I am sceptical.  I am obviously not going to claim 
that no-one has been falsely accused of being sexist or racist or otherwise 
bigoted.  There is a genuine issue here.  But the point is that the debate should go 
on at this level; as a discussion about whether or not certain statements or 
positions are racist or sexist or whatever. Claiming that one’s critic’s are being 
“politically correct” for even raising the question is so much mud in the water. 
 
Throughout this paper I have tried to show that what the Right has attempted to 
characterise as a new tyranny of the “politically correct” is either a gross 
misrepresentation or just the normal operations of politics, language and culture.  
Left-wing proponents of political correctness are not advocating anything new 
when they suggest that some sorts of opinions and behaviours should be 
considered as beyond the pale and cause for criticism.  What is new is that 
instead of accepting that the bounds of respectable opinion should be defined by 
reverence for God, Queen, Property and Nation, the Left has suggested that they 
should be delineated by respect for persons regardless of race, gender or sexual 
preference.  Of course whether it should be decided this way or that way is a 
political question.  
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Instead of talking about “political correctness”, then, we should be talking about 
politics.  We should be arguing about whether certain sorts of speech are sexist 
or racist and about the consequences of tolerating them or regulating them.  We 
should be examining the content of our culture and taking honest stock of whose 
voices are silenced and whose promoted.  We should celebrate the widespread 
criticism which occurs when someone puts forward a racist or sexist opinion 
rather than defending their right to do so as “free speech” while at the same time 
trying to silence their critics with accusations of censorship.  Even when 
censorship is on the agenda, instead of mouthing off about “the evils of 
censorship” we should admit that we all agree that censorship is sometimes 
justified and get down to discussing whether or not it is in this case.  We should 
be doing all this without talking about “political correctness” at all.   
 
The expression “political correctness” serves only to cloud the real issues at 
stake in debates around the politics of speech - which is why the Right have 
promoted it so vigorously.  It confuses criticism with censorship and 
deliberately mobilises the public’s fear of state regulation of speech where this is 
clearly not at issue.  It does this despite the Right’s own extensively documented 
enthusiasm for using the powers of the State to silence its critics and despite the 
extensive restrictions on “free speech” which exist to this day.  It ignores both 
the fact that everyone across the political spectrum agrees that some sort of 
censorship is justified and the more philosophically interesting truth that some 
form of censorship is actually necessary to enable productive debate to occur at 
all.  By implicitly opposing “political correctness” to “political freedom” it 
deliberately obscures the fact that the alternative to a left-wing political 
correctness is actually a right-wing political correctness.  These confusions and 
obfuscations are no accident.  They serve a political agenda.  The main function 
of the right-wing rhetoric of “political correctness” is to attempt to further 
marginalise the Left and to silence dissent.  Those who do not which to 
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participate in this silencing should work to expose this rhetoric for what it is 
wherever it occurs.37 
 
 
                                                 
37 I  would like to thank Robert Goodin and Krysti Guest for discussion, comments and support 
during the writing of this paper. 
